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ABSTRACT The digital identity (or electronic identity) of a person is about being able to prove upon
authentication who one is on the Internet, with a certain level of assurance, such as by means of some
attributes obtained from a trustworthy Identity Provider. In Europe, the eIDAS Network allows the citizens
to authenticate securely with their national credentials and to provide such personal attributes when getting
access to Service Providers in a different European country. Although the eIDAS Network is more and
more known, its integration with real operational services is still at an initial phase. This paper presents
two eIDAS-enabled services, Login with eIDAS and Wi-Fi access with eIDAS, that we have designed,
implemented, deployed, and validated at the Politecnico di Torino in Italy. The validation study involved
several undergraduate students, who have run the above services with their authentication credentials and
platforms and with minimal indications on their usage. The results indicate that the services were beneficial.
Several advantages exist both for the users and for the Service Providers, such as resistance to some security
attacks and the possibility to adopt the service without prior user registration (e.g. for short meetings, or in
public places). However, some students expressed doubts about exploiting their national eID for Wi-Fi
access, mainly in connection with usability and privacy issues. We discuss also these concerns, along with
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed services.
INDEX TERMS Cross-border authentication, eIDAS regulation, electronic identification, login service,
wi-fi access service.
I. INTRODUCTION
The possibility to prove the identity of a person is a primary
requirement in online services handling highly sensitive or
critical data. Nevertheless, even in less critical services, like
Wi-Fi access, secure user authentication solutions are needed
to avoid scenarios where the attackers impersonate a valid
user (by exploiting weak authentication credentials) and then
perform more complex security attacks.
To get access to public or private services, several countries
across Europe have developed various solutions to allow
citizens to use their digital or electronic identity (eID). In the
first place, an authentication credential, like for example a
cryptographic smart card, is given to the citizen to be used
for authentication and identification purposes. Such cards are
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Zheng Yan .
considered highly secure and typically contain some personal
data and the cryptographic material (a digital certificate and
the corresponding private key) to be used for the authen-
tication procedure. This approach has been used so far in
several countries like Italy, France, Germany, Austria, Spain,
and Portugal. In Europe, in 2020, it is foreseen that citizens
will hold more than 250 million eID (smart) cards, which
captures half of the total population of 500 million citizens
[1]. However, smart-cards pose various problems, from diffi-
cult technical integration into applications to complex usage
by a citizen with basic technological knowledge. So various
alternative user-friendly solutions have appeared for network
authentication and identification. For example, the authenti-
cation credential could be a reusable password assigned to a
citizen in a secure way, to be used alone or in conjunctionwith
a one-time password generated or obtained via a personal
device, such as a mobile phone.
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A. EIDAS BASIS
Over time, several European Union (EU)Member State (MS)
countries developed specific solutions or protocols to exploit
the digital identities at national level, such as the SPID proto-
col in Italy (further described in Section III-A). On the other
hand, several EU-funded projects, such as the STORK [2],
FutureID [3], and eID@Cloud [4] ones investigated how the
various digital identity systems of different countries can be
interconnected and deployed in a unified infrastructure. The
STORK project defined and implemented an eID interop-
erability framework as well as its exploitation in some real
use cases, like safe chat or academic student registration.
In particular, STORK addressed the legal impact and the
recognition of eIDs, it defined a so-called ‘‘STORK person
identifier’’, and it addressed some privacy issues on the (per-
sonal) data transfer through the framework.
The eIDAS (electronic IDentification, Authentication, and
trust Services) Regulation 910/2014 for electronic trans-
actions in the internal market, which put the basis for
the legal recognition of eIDs across the EU, exploited the
STORK findings and results. Moreover, the software for
the eIDAS-Nodes has also inherited parts of the STORK
code. Currently, the European Commission (EC), through
its Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) programme, and in
particular via the CEF eID Building Block is performing
several activities to support eIDAS implementation and adop-
tion. In practice, CEF offers a set of eID services composed
of the technical specifications, the software, the testing ser-
vices and the supporting services. In particular, CEF main-
tains the eIDAS specification [5], it periodically updates
and distributes the reference code for the eIDAS-Nodes [6]
composing the eIDAS Network, and it performs the vali-
dation of the eIDAS-Nodes in the various MS countries.
Moreover, it provides information on the current state-of-
play of eID in Europe such as the eIDAS-Node implemen-
tation status per country [7], or the overview of the eID
schemes per country [8]. The Innovation and Networks Exec-
utive Agency (INEA) of the EC promotes and funds vari-
ous projects under the CEF Telecom calls (eIdentification &
eSignature) to facilitate the integration of public and private
service providers with the eIDAS Network.
Throughout this paper, we call notified authentication cre-
dential (NotifiedAuthC) one provided by an IdP (Identity
Provider) implementing a notified eID scheme in an EU
country. Such credentials are typically different from the ones
that commercial companies or organizations issue to their
registered users for access to specific business services.
Inmany countries, dedicated government agencies perform
citizen identification and issue the NotifiedAuthC to them. In
other countries, also private entities (such as banks or telecom
operators) can perform this task. For example, this is the
case of Italy where commercial IdPs exist, such as InfoCert
SpA or Poste Italiane, provide NotifiedAuthC to the Italian
citizens. Since some identification procedures and authen-
tication methods are more secure than others, the concept
of ‘‘level of assurance’’ (LoA) has appeared. In brief, LoA
classifies electronic credentials into three levels depending on
their security, robustness, and issuance process [1]. Currently,
three assurance levels exist in eIDAS: Low, Substantial, and
High. They are based on the ISO-29115 [9] standard and the
Quality of Authentication Assurance (QAA) concept defined
in the STORK project [10]. Countries individually map the
characteristics of their eID schemes to the eIDAS LoA levels,
for example as documented in [11] and [12].
B. MOTIVATION
Even though several works [13] describe the eIDAS Net-
work, the protocol, and its evolution, its integration with
real services usable by the citizens is still an open task.
Some previous works addressed the connection of generic
FIWARE-based OAuth 2.0 services to the eIDAS infrastruc-
ture [14], or the registration of Erasmus students at visiting
universities [15]. In general, as stated in [16], ‘‘current and
future problem in integrating identity management systems is
themyriad of service providers that are not willing (and/or not
capable) to implement large modifications in their systems’’.
The solutions addressing this problem should be technically
sound, scalable, economically viable, convenient for human
users, and should recognize inter-organizational aspects.
This paper describes the design and implementation of two
services integrated with the eIDAS Network, namely Login
with eIDAS and Wi-Fi access with eIDAS. In principle, these
services have to securely authenticate and identify a user
before granting access to the service. Additionally, theymight
require a restricted set of personal attributes, e.g. name and
surname, and they might need additional specific attributes
for authorization purposes. For example, a possible autho-
rization policy could state that Wi-Fi access is granted only
to persons fulfilling special requirements, such as the ones
participating in a specific meeting or event.
Implementing an eIDAS-enabled Login service is not triv-
ial, primarily because there is no unique and persistent iden-
tifier for every single person across the EU. Unique citizen
identifiers typically exist in many countries, but: 1) often,
they are not persistent, that is for the same person, they
might change over time; 2) they might not be transferred
abroad, due to national privacy legislation; ) they should not
be shared among different Service Providers (SPs) to avoid
user profiling, which implies that possibly other identifiers
need to be derived from the national one; 4) in some countries,
they might not be defined at all. A unique identifier could be
considered a mean of potential mass-surveillance and a hit to
privacy, so other forms of identification might be used [17].
On the other hand, also implementing an eIDAS-enabled
Wi-Fi access service is not straightforward. Many SP captive
portals nowadays use dedicated hardware, e.g. a Wireless
LAN Controller (WLC), and the SP directly registers the
users on its backend, typically with a username and pass-
word. So, an additional dedicated application, invoked by the
WLC, is required to communicate with the eIDAS Network
for user authentication and to transform the retrieved data
into a registered user recognized by the WLC. Moreover,
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since the portal denies all traffic until a user is properly
authenticated and authorized, the SP has to configure addi-
tional information before the authentication process can take
place. The SP cannot deny all traffic to unauthenticated
users but it must permit communication with the components
of the national eID schemes and the intermediate network
elements.
C. CONTRIBUTIONS
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are the
following ones.
(1). The design and implementation of a Login service
allowing user authenticationwith national eIDs via the eIDAS
Network. We discuss the lack of a unique identifier (per-
sistent) for every citizen across the EU, and we propose
a solution addressing the user identification by exploiting
the natural person identifiers. To build this service, we have
integrated and transformed data managed by different parties,
i.e. the Student ServiceOffice, the eIDAS-Node, and the IdPs.
In this way, other SPs may understand how to connect to the
eIDAS Network.
(2). The design and implementation of a Wi-Fi access
service, in which the users exploit their national eIDs and
the eIDAS Network to obtain Wi-Fi access. This service
may extend the standard Wi-Fi access already available in
academic institutions, to support non academic users too.
More in general, it may be helpful where the SP wants
to provide Wi-Fi access via citizen’s national eID without
prior user registration. Finally, the service might be adopted
in high-security environments where the Wi-Fi access with
username and password is considered insecure, so the user
would be required to use a strong credential, such as that of
eIDAS level Substantial and High.
D. ORGANISATION
The paper is organized as follows. Related works are pre-
sented in Sec. II. The eIDASNetwork, protocol, and attributes
as well as the main aspects of the SPID system in Italy
are briefly discussed in Sec. III. The detailed design and
implementation of the Login with eIDAS and Wi-Fi access
with eIDAS services are described in Sec. IV and Sec. V.
Sec. VI describes service validation made by a set of users
we have involved in testing our scenarios. Finally conclusions
appear in Sec. VII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. INTEGRATION OF EIDAS NETWORK WITH OTHER
PRE-EXISTENT SYSTEMS
Identities, in general, can be assigned to individuals, legal
entities (companies, partnerships), but also to assets (e.g.
cars, buildings), or software processes. However, digital iden-
tities are mostly associated with individuals, that is with
natural or legal persons. The identities and the attributes
about them, their efficient collection and processing, are
gaining increasing interest not only to build more efficient
public administration solutions but also in building smart
cities or even for Internet of Things [18]. Some solutions,
like the blockchain-based identity proposed in [19], col-
lect several attributes and securely transmit them to other
systems components for verification and to create a digital
identity.
In eIDAS, no single unified solution exists for combin-
ing the basic identification attributes for a person (e.g. her
name, surname, and date of birth) with other attributes about
that person (e.g. her citizenship, academic title, or her role
in an organization). While the personal attributes are typi-
cally retrieved from the national eID card or from an IdP,
the additional attributesmight be retrieved from other entities.
Nevertheless, real services typically need many of them,
for example citizenship is mandatory for voting, while the
academic title is needed to apply for jobs or for course regis-
tration.
Two different directions exist to merge user authenti-
cation through eIDAS and user attributes management. In
the first approach, existing platforms or frameworks han-
dling different personal attributes, like academic title or
healthcare data, add support for eIDAS authentication. For
example, the HEALTHeID project [20] integrated eIDAS
authentication into OpenNCP [21], a framework used to
retrieve cross-border healthcare attributes. Another example
is MyAcademicID, which aims to enable eIDAS authenti-
cation into the eduGAIN framework [22]. In this kind of
solution, the main objective is to allow eIDAS authentication
to access the existing services and then to combine the basic
attributes retrieved through eIDAS with other personal data,
already available in the platform. The attribute aggregation
requires to securely link the data obtained through eIDAS to
other data stored in the framework or retrieved through an
alternative protocol. Since currently there is no unique person
identifier valid globally, but rather each country, organization,
or framework defined its own user identifier, the attribute
aggregation is not automatic and normally requires some user
involvement.
In the second approach, the eIDAS-Nodes are enhanced
to support new (sector-specific) attributes. Moreover, they
retrieve attributes both from the IdPs and from other potential
additional entities, the Attributes Providers (APs), by extend-
ing the specific interface of the eIDAS-Node. The eID4U
project [23] exploited this approach. The main advantage,
in this case, is that the eIDAS-Node strongly orchestrates
the citizen authentication through eIDAS and the attribute
retrieval and aggregation. The main disadvantage is that
the eIDAS services either need to be built from scratch,
or they need to be adapted to the local systems and for-
mats in place at the SPs and APs. Moreover, changes in
attributes formats might trigger changes in the eIDAS-Nodes,
or at least in its Specific part. This implies delays in updat-
ing the eIDAS-Nodes and deploying them into produc-
tion (if the operators of the eIDAS-Nodes authorize such
transition), and the necessity to perform interoperability
tests.
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B. LOGIN AND WI-FI ACCESS SERVICES: EXISTING
SOLUTIONS AND INTEGRATION WITH EIDAS
The Login and Wi-Fi access services are frequent,
well-known services, and several solutions exist for their
implementation.
Eduroam [24] is a world-wide international roaming ser-
vice providing network access to people in research and
education organizations (like teachers, researchers, and stu-
dents) when they are visiting other institutions. In some
countries, the service is also available in other places like
libraries, museums, railway stations, and airports. Eduroam
authentication is provided by the user’s home institution and
it is based on IEEE 802.1x and a hierarchy of RADIUS
servers [25], which typically consists of three levels: orga-
nizational, national, and global. When the local RADIUS
server can’t authenticate the guest user because she is not
among the local users, the user’s credentials are forwarded
to the home institution RADIUS server passing through
the national level Eduroam RADIUS server and, if needed,
the top level Eduroam RADIUS server. In this way, users
don’t need new credentials to access the network of the visited
institution, but on the other hand it is not possible to use
stronger authentication credentials other than username and
password.
Although widely deployed and used, Eduroam presents
some drawbacks, such as single point of failure and pri-
vacy leakage. If one of the RADIUS servers in the hierar-
chy is down, this impacts the overall service. Identity theft
vulnerabilities and MITM (Man-in-the-Middle) attacks in
Eduroam have been investigated in [26], along with some
possible countermeasures. Other authors [27] proposed to
enhance Eduroam security via a new trust hierarchy based
on RADIUS/TLS [28], while Liu and Goto [29] proposed
a scheme aimed to improve Eduroam stability and perfor-
mance.
Some blockchain-based solutions for Wi-Fi access exist
too. Trustroam [30] proposes a blockchain-based distributed
authentication scheme for cross-domain Wi-Fi access,
which prevents the single point of failure and privacy
leakage. An authentication method exploiting Bitcoin 2.0
for a more secure Wi-Fi access has been proposed
too [31].
Authors in [32] proposed a method for dynamic fire-
wall reconfiguration based on data (meta-attributes and
user attributes) retrieved through the STORK infrastruc-
ture. Additionally, they discussed an important aspect to be
considered in the services exploiting federated identity man-
agement infrastructures for network access: the SP needs to
apply some authorization decisions before the user authen-
tication is complete. In practice, the SP has to whitelist
access to some endpoints for permitting users to reach their
IdPs. The same authors extended this concept into a gen-
eral one, named authorize-then-authenticate, and proposed
some possible implementations [33]. The whitelisting fea-
ture is required also in the Wi-Fi access service proposed
here.
III. AUTHENTICATION THROUGH EIDAS AND SPID
The eIDAS Network is composed of several national nodes,
called eIDAS-Nodes, and it supports two models, proxy and
middleware. In the proxy model, an EU MS runs the eIDAS-
Node, which is composed of two logical elements: an eIDAS-
Proxy-Service (in short, eIDAS Proxy) and one (or more)
eIDAS-Connector(s) (in short eIDAS Connector), as shown
in Fig. 1. Note that the specification distinguishes among the
Sending MS and the Receiving MS. The Sending MS is the
one whose eID scheme is used in the authentication process,
and thus it sends the authentication responses to the Receiving
MS. The Receiving MS is the one where the SP (also called
Relying Party, RP) requests authentication of a person before
providing a service. Note that in this paper we consider only
natural persons, while eIDAS also covers legal persons, or a
natural person representing a legal one.
FIGURE 1. High level view of eIDAS architecture (proxy model).
The middleware model, adopted basically by Germany,
does not require the Sending MS to run an eIDAS Proxy
but it demands other Receiving MS to operate a Middleware
software. This element implements an eIDAS-Middleware-
Service, which is provided by the Sending MS [34]. In the
proxy model, the national eIDAS Proxy connects to the
national accredited IdPs implementing a (notified) electronic
identity scheme under eIDAS to provide cross-border authen-
tication. Moreover, the eIDAS Connector is connected with
the SPs requesting cross-border authentication to persons that
access their services. The eIDAS-Nodes communicate via a
dedicated eIDAS protocol [5], which is based on the SAML
2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile [35] to transfer authentication
data and eIDAS attributes. Each eIDAS-Node shares (eIDAS)
SAML metadata with the other eIDAS-Nodes through a spe-
cific mechanism.
The communication between IdPs and SPs with the
national eIDAS-Node is specific to each country. For exam-
ple, if the eIDAS-Node and the national SPs and IdPs com-
municate via the SAML protocol, then they share national
SAML metadata.
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As shown in Fig. 1, when a person tries to access an
eIDAS-enabled service (step 1), cross-border authentication
is delegated from the SP to its national eIDAS Connector
(step 2). Next, the citizen selects the country in which she will
authenticate (step 3) and subsequently the eIDAS authentica-
tion request is forwarded to the eIDAS Proxy of the citizen’s
country (step 4). The eIDAS authentication request is handled
by the eIDAS Proxy according to the MS specific approach.
Typically, a new authentication request is constructed by
the eIDAS Proxy and is sent through the user’s browser
to the national IdP implementing the national eID scheme,
where the citizen is asked to authenticate with a national
eID (step 5). For example in Italy, the eIDAS authentica-
tion request is converted into a SPID authentication request.
Upon successful citizen authentication, the eIDAS authenti-
cation response, which contains also the requested (personal)
attributes, is returned through the eIDAS Network back to the
requesting SP (step 6). Finally, the SP grants/denies access
to the service based on the authentication response received
(step 7). User consent is typically asked twice: in step 3 to
inform the user of the attributes that will be requested, and
in step 6 before transferring their values to the other eIDAS
Node. Each eIDAS-Node is composed of a Specific part
and a Generic part (common to all the eIDAS-Nodes). The
functional modules have been redesigned over time, so for
example the version 2.x of the eIDAS code proposes a more
flexible approach in the Specific part.
According to the specification, only a restricted set of natu-
ral person attributes may pass through the eIDAS-Nodes [36].
Four of them are mandatory, in the sense that the national eID
scheme must always return their values to the eIDAS Proxy:
FamilyName, FirstName, DateOfBirth, and PersonIdenti-
fier. This set of mandatory attributes is named eIDAS Min-
imum Data Set (MDS). Other attributes like BirthName,
CurrentAddress, PlaceOfBirth, and Gender are optional:
they may be requested but the national eID scheme might not
return their values to the eIDAS Proxy.
Are these attributes enough to build real services? In
some cases, they are not sufficient and new ones need to
be defined and supported in the eIDAS-Nodes. For exam-
ple, in [15] new attributes needed to register the students
in a visiting university have been enabled on the eIDAS-
Nodes. In the services discussed here, we encountered two
situations.
In case of Login with eIDAS, the eIDAS MDS attributes
are rather inadequate. The Login service needs a persistent
unique identifier for any citizen across the EU, widely recog-
nized and used in different domains, or at least in a specific
sector (e.g. academia). Unfortunately such an identifier does
not exist in eIDAS, for several good reasons discussed above.
Even the eIDAS attribute named PersonIdentifier is not
unique for one person and it might change in time so it is
not directly usable for the Login service.
In case of Wi-Fi access with eIDAS, the attributes in the
eIDAS MDS are too many and sensitive. Thus, the users
might deny user consent for their retrieval or may ask for
supplemental guarantees with respect to the processing and
storage of their personal data on the SP side.
A. AUTHENTICATION THROUGH SPID IN ITALY
The Public Digital Identity System (in Italian, SPID - Sistema
Pubblico di Identità Digitale) [37] is a federated identity sys-
tem allowing Italian citizens to access public administration
SPs by using SPID credentials issued by the SPID IdPs. Cur-
rently, support for SPID is mandatory in public services, e.g.
to access Italian university portals or the services offered by
ministries and governmental agencies. As mentioned in [38],
SPID is a public identity system which permits public and
private entities to act as IdP, provided that they are accredited
by the Agency for Digital Italy (AgID). The SPID IdPs have
to ensure a suitable procedure for the initial identification of
citizens, and have to provide authentication credentials called
SPID credentials of different levels of security.
On the other hand, since SPID is mandatory for public ser-
vices, all public administrations must allow citizens to access
their online services via SPID credentials. Private service
providers can also join SPID by following a specific technical
and administrative procedure [39]. SPID IdPs and SPs inter-
act with AgID, which has a central role in creating the circle
of trust between them, and in maintaining and distributing
accurate information about them through a dedicated ‘‘SPID
Registry’’ [40].
Examples of Italian SPs that have added support for SPID
authentication are Agenzia delle Entrate (Fiscal Agency
in Italy), or INPS (Istituto Nazionale per la Previdenza
Sociale), the entity in charge with social and retirement pro-
cedures. They allow citizens to use their SPID credentials for
tax declarations or to handle maternity leave, emergencies,
or retirement procedures. Currently, there are 4283 public
administration SPs and 7 private sector SPs, and 9 IdPs have
issued nearly 7 million SPID credentials [41].
SPID users can authenticate by using three different levels
of security, called Level of Assurance (LoA):
• one-factor authentication, for example username and
password. It corresponds to the Low security level,
called SpidL1, which was mapped to eIDAS Low LoA.
• two-factor authentication, for example username, pass-
word, and one-time password (OTP). It corresponds to
the Intermediate security level, called SpidL2, which
was mapped to eIDAS Substantial LoA.
• two-factor authentication and secure device, for exam-
ple username, password, and public-key authentication
based on a smartcard. It corresponds to High security
level, called SpidL3, which was mapped to eIDAS High
LoA.
The SPID protocol [40] exploits the SAML 2.0 Web
Browser SSO Profile to exchange authentication messages
between SPs and IdPs. These entities share their own SAML
metadata through the AgID-maintained SPID Registry [42].
Each SP defines in its own SAML metadata one or more sets
of requested attributes, and each set is identified by a numeric
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index.When the SP sends the authentication request (by using
the HTTP Redirect binding or the HTTP POST binding),
it refers to the attribute set by specifying its index number.
After user authentication and user consent to attributes trans-
fer, the IdP answers with an authentication response by using
the HTTP POST binding. SPID SAML messages are signed,
but the attributes values are not encrypted.
B. THE ROLES OF IDP PROXY AND SP PROXY IN
CONNECTING SPID TO EIDAS
SPID defines a series of user attributes including spidCode,
name, familyName, dateOfBirth, placeOfBirth, address,
gender, that need to be mapped onto the eIDAS attributes.
To adapt the eIDAS Network to the SPID system, the FICEP
(First Italian Cross-border eIDAS Proxy Service) project
defined two additional modules, namely the SP Proxy and
the IdP Proxy. The SP Proxy translates the messages between
the SPID SPs and the Italian eIDAS Connector, while the
IdP Proxy translates the messages between the SPID IdPs
and the Italian eIDAS Proxy Service, as shown in Fig. 2.
Thus, the SPID SPs communicate with the eIDAS Connec-
tor via the SP Proxy, while other SPs may communicate
directly with the eIDAS Connector by exploiting the eIDAS
protocol. The mapping between the SPID attributes and the
eIDAS ones is shown in Table 1. Since an Italian citizen
may have multiple SPID credentials provided by different
IdPs, the spidCode is different depending on which IdP the
person has used for authentication. Consequently, the citizens
exploiting SPID for eIDAS authentication may have several
different eIDAS PersonIdentifiers.
FIGURE 2. Italian eIDAS-Node architecture.
IV. LOGIN WITH EIDAS SERVICE
The Login service is a fundamental security service provided
by our university. Once a user is logged into the university
portal, she can perform many operations and she can get
access to various academic and personal data. For example,
TABLE 1. Mapping between SPID and eIDAS attributes. (*)
<fullCvaddress> tag is not allowed anymore since eIDAS v.2.2 [43].
a teacher can view andmodify some data in his profile, he can
enter exam dates and test results, he can manage the teaching
material and the homeworks for the students. On the other
hand, the students can access the course materials for the
enrolled courses, they can book for a test, and they can view
the test results. So, it is important that the service is always
operational. Moreover, strong and correct user identification
is vital: the case where a person may access someone else’s
data due to wrong identification must never happen.
Currently, students and academic staff of the Politecnico di
Torino (Polito) can login into the university portal by using
any of three methods:
• (M1) username and password;
• (M2) public-key authentication (based on soft or hard
X.509 certificate);
• (M3) authentication with SPID.
We analyse now the requirements of the Login with eIDAS
service, and we detail the adopted solution.
A. ANALYSIS OF THE LOGIN WITH EIDAS SERVICE
The idea in this service is to correctly identify a person of
any EU MS country registered at our university, based on a
set of attributes retrieved through the eIDAS Network and the
registration data stored in the university database. We assume
first that the person (e.g. student, professor, researcher) is
registered in the Polito database with the following data,
named Dregistration:
• name
• surname
• date of birth
• place of birth (country, in case of foreign person)
• gender
Additionally, the university database typically contains
other personal information, such as Italian fiscal code, citi-
zenship, current and temporary address, passport (or identity
card) number.
When a user exploits the eIDAS Network to login, the data
retrieved through the framework is composed of the manda-
tory attributes in the eIDASMDS: FamilyName, FirstName,
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DateOfBirth, and PersonIdentifier. We call the above data
set DeIDASbasic. Additionally, DeIDASbasic could contain also
BirthName, CurrentAddress, PlaceOfBirth and Gender
but since these attributes are optional, their values could be
missing. If the eIDAS-Node is enhanced with new (sector-
specific) attributes, then other additional (personal) data
might be retrieved through the eIDAS Network, e.g. a pass-
port number or a health card id number. However, we can
assume that this additional data is optional, and consequently,
the eIDAS Network might not return the corresponding
values.
Since the (eIDAS) PersonIdentifier is not stored by
default in the university database, then one possible solution
to perform a login with eIDAS could consist in comparing
the tuple (name, surname, date of birth) in Dregistration with
the (FamilyName, FirstName, DateOfBirth) in DeIDASbasic.
If a match is found, then the user is given access to the uni-
versity portal. Unfortunately, the above (apparently simple)
operation is subject to two potential problems: transliteration
and homonyms.
1) TRANSLITERATION
Generally speaking, transliteration is the process of transfer-
ring a word from the alphabet of one language to another. In
our scenario, transliteration can generate problems because
small differences may occur in one person’s name when she
is registered in the university database with respect to her
identity registered in the national IdP. Nowadays, the person’s
names may appear with several name variants either across
different languages or even within the same one. Quite often,
such situations occur for the names containing accents, or for
persons who have more than one birth name. For example,
[44] points to 50 articles in English published on the 14th
April 2005 where four different orthographies for the same
person occurred: Rafik Hariri, Rafik al-Hariri, Rafiq Hariri,
and Rafiq al-Hariri.
Consequently, in our case, there is a high probability that
for some persons their name or surname registered in the
university database (stored in Dregistration) could differ in part
from the ones retrieved through the eIDAS Network (stored
in DeIDASbasic).
2) HOMONYMS
Another problem concerns the probability to encounter two
persons with the same attributes (name, surname, date of
birth). These are the so-called homonyms. If we consider
an additional attribute (like place of birth), fewer homonyms
could occur, but they still may appear in practice [45]. For
example, in our town, the office in charge of the web portal
of Turin municipality encountered 8 persons with the same
name, surname, date of birth, and place of birth.
To distinguish between homonyms, the persons must have
distinct identification numbers, correctly stored and pro-
cessed. For example, in Italy, even if two persons have the
same name, surname, date of birth, gender, and place of birth,
their Italian fiscal code is different. Note that every person
FIGURE 3. Polito service infrastructure with connection to eIDAS
Network.
living or studying (even temporarily) in Italy has an Italian
fiscal code assigned by the Agenzia delle Entrate.
B. DESIGN OF LOGIN WITH EIDAS SERVICE
The service is composed of two phases: registration and
authentication.
1) EIDAS PERSONIDENTIFIER REGISTRATION PHASE
In this phase, the person who has an account into the univer-
sity database performs first the login operation with one of the
mentioned methods, e.g. username and password, hard or soft
X.509 certificate, SPID credential. Then, the person performs
authentication through eIDAS to associate his current eIDAS
PersonIdentifierwith his profile. The personmay havemore
than one eIDAS PersonIdentifiers. However, he will register
in his profile the one he will use to perform the login with
eIDAS. The functionality of this phase, along with all the
components involved in its execution, is shown in Fig. 4.
2) AUTHENTICATION WITH EIDAS AND LOGIN PHASE
In this phase, the person authenticates through the eIDAS
Network, and the eIDAS PersonIdentifier is obtained in the
authentication response. This value is confronted with the
eIDAS PersonIdentifier registered in the previous phase,
and the internal components of the Polito IdP ecosystem fur-
ther process it to correctly identify the person and to provide
access to his area. The functional workflow for this phase is
shown in Fig. 5.
Before detailing the phases above, we explain briefly the
interconnection of several elements involved in providing
services at our university. The Polito services are federated
with a central identity ecosystem (Fig. 3), which exploits
the Shibboleth open-source software [46] and the SAML
protocol for the Single Sign-On feature. The Polito identity
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FIGURE 4. Sequence diagram for eIDAS PersonIdentifier registration
phase. Notation: enc(X )Y means data X is encrypted by using
X.509 certificate of Y , (Auth)Z means data Auth is digitally signed by Z .
ecosystem exploits a central database of registered users,
and the Italian fiscal code is the primary key for handling
information about a user. To allow authentication via SPID,
the Polito identity ecosystem contains the SPID SP (SPID
Service Provider) component, which is in charge of the com-
munication and trust established with the SPID IdPs. When a
person authenticates via the SPID system, the authentication
response returned to the SPID SP contains the Italian fiscal
code. This value is further passed to the Polito IdP where it is
processed internally to allow access of the person to her area.
FIGURE 5. Sequence diagram for Login with eIDAS phase. Notation:
enc(X )Y means data X is encrypted by using X.509 certificate of Y ,
(Auth)Z means data Auth is digitally signed by Z .
To integrate eIDAS authentication into the services,
the Polito identity ecosystem was further extended with an
additional eIDAS Custom App, which communicates with
both the Polito IdP and the SPID SP. Since our system
administrators preferred not to modify either the IdP logic
or the central database itself, this application (and the related
database) was developed. Alternatively, authors in [14] have
adopted an approach which requires the modification of the
registered user data with eIDAS identification information. In
their work, the FIWARE Keyrock Identity Provider storing
profiles of the registered users has been extended with a
so-called ‘‘eidas profile’’ containing the eIDAS PersonIden-
tifier, in addition to the user information containing other
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data, e.g. UUID in Keyrock, displayName, email, password.
In the Polito case, the eIDAS Custom App handles the asso-
ciation of the eIDAS PersonIdentifier(s) with other useful
information (including the Italian fiscal code).
C. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
1) EIDAS (PERSON) IDENTIFIER REGISTRATION PHASE
The workflow for this phase is described further below and is
shown in Fig. 4.
The user accesses the university portal, where she founds
a dedicated Login button. Once pressed, the user is redi-
rected to the university IdP, which is implemented with a
Shibboleth IdP component. The user can select one of the
local authentication methods, e.g. username and password,
X.509 certificate, or SPID (step 1). If authentication with one
of these credentials is successful, the user gets redirected to
his profile area, where he will find an eIDAS button (step 2).
By pressing it, the control passes to the Login service, which
involves the eIDAS Custom App and the SPID SP to handle
the eIDAS authentication. The SPID SP performs several
operations such as saving the user session id, which contains
information about the user authenticated by the university
IdP. In Shibboleth, the session layer in the IdP tracks infor-
mation associated with a subject across multiple transactions
separated significantly in time. Then, the SPID SP constructs
a SPID authentication request (SPID-Auth-Req) that is sent
through the user’s browser to the SP Proxy, where the user can
choose the country where he wants to be authenticated (steps
3-5). On the SP Proxy interface, the user selects his country
where he will authenticate with a notified authentication
credential (step 6). The SP Proxy translates the authentication
request from the SPID format to the eIDAS format (step
7), and the user browser is redirected along with the eIDAS
authentication request (eIDAS-Auth-Req) to the Italian eIDAS
Connector (step 8). Next, the eIDAS-Auth-Req is sent through
the eIDAS Network and an eIDAS authentication response
(eIDAS-Auth-Res) is received back by the eIDAS Connector
as described in Sec. III (steps 9-15). The eIDAS-Auth-Res
is sent to the SP Proxy (step 16), which translates it into
the SPID format (SPID-Auth-Res), and sends it to the Login
service through the user browser (steps 17-18). When it’s
received, the Login Service extracts the inResponseTo field
from the SPID SAML response and uses it to retrieve the
previously saved user session id. Next, it saves the eIDAS
PersonIdentifier in the user profile corresponding to the
retrieved user session id. Since the user profile also contains
the Italian fiscal code, the eIDAS PersonIdentifier is asso-
ciated with it. Once this setup phase is completed, the user
is able to access his profile area on the university portal by
authenticating through eIDAS (step 19).
2) LOGIN WITH EIDAS PHASE
The sequence diagram for this phase is shown in Fig. 5, and
is detailed further below.
The user clicks on ‘‘Login with eIDAS’’ on the dedicated
Login area of the Polito website (step 1). The Login Ser-
vice starts a SPID authentication, i.e. it generates a SPID-
Auth-Req, which is sent to the SP Proxy where the user
selects his country (steps 2-4). The SP Proxy translates the
authentication request from SPID format to eIDAS format
and redirects the user browser to the Italian eIDAS Connector
along with the eIDAS-Auth-Req (steps 5-6). Next, the usual
eIDAS steps of the eIDAS protocol are executed as described
in Section III (steps 7-13). Once the SP Proxy receives the
eIDAS-Auth-Res (step 14), it translates it to SPID format.
Thus, the SP Proxy prepares the SPID-Auth-Res and sends
it back through the user browser to the Login service (steps
15-16). Finally, the Login Service extracts from the SPID-
Auth-Res the value of the spidCode attribute, which con-
tains an eIDAS PersonIdentifier value and checks it against
the eIDAS PersonIdentifier value stored in the Polito user
profile. If a match is found, then the access is granted to the
restricted user area (step 17), otherwise, the access is denied
(step 18). Some screenshots illustrating the performed steps
for an Italian citizen are shown in Fig. 6.
D. DISCUSSION
The Student Service Office may exploit the Login with
eIDAS service in several ways. For example, if a person
forgets his password (that often happens after summer vaca-
tions), he might run a password recovery procedure involving
‘‘Login with eIDAS’’ to allow him to set up a new password.
Normally, the password reset procedure involves either an
interaction with a person in the user support or requires reg-
istration to a dedicated service for password reset via SMS.
With eIDAS, these procedures could be avoided.
Moreover, the Student Service Office may select services
that can be accessed only upon authentication with more
secure LoA levels, e.g. Substantial or High. So, in this
case, the students and teachers can exploit their national eIDs
to easily get access to such services. For example, Wi-Fi
access is a typical service provided upon authentication with
username and password. If an attacker manages to guess or
intercept a password used to get access to Wi-Fi, then he can
impersonate a legitimate user and perform advanced (insider)
attacks with the stolen identity. By requiring a Substantial
LoA for network access, the users will employ a stronger
authentication methods In this way, password sniffing and
guessing attacks can be mitigated, and this is an advantage
for the company (e.g. university) and for the legitimate users.
V. WI-FI ACCESS WITH EIDAS SERVICE
A. ANALYSIS OF WI-FI ACCESS INTEGRATED
WITH EIDAS NETWORK
The goal in this service is to provide Wi-Fi access to Inter-
net at Politecnico di Torino to EU citizens by leveraging
the eIDAS Network, citizen’s notified authentication cre-
dentials, and the Wi-Fi infrastructure already in place. Cur-
rently, Polito provides Wi-Fi access either to the persons
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FIGURE 6. Some screenshots of the user browser in Login with eIDAS phase. (a) Initial page with dedicated button. (b) Selection of citizen
country on SP Proxy. (c) User consent page for attributes requested. (d) Selection of authentication method, SPID/national card (in Italy).
(e) Authentication with a SPID credential. (f) User consent for valued attributes. (g) Access granted to the restricted area on web portal.
(students/academic staff) registered at our university, or to
the visiting persons working in academic domain (through
eduroam). By exploiting our proposed service, other EU
citizens visiting our university will be able to gain Wi-Fi
access by using theirNotifiedAuthC. Such persons can belong
to various organizations, companies, or private entities that
temporarily visit our campus (e.g. for ameeting, a conference,
or an exhibition) but they cannot access Wi-Fi either because
they are neither academic personnel (so they cannot use
eduroam) nor registered at our university.
We have addressed several challenges in designing this
service.
Challenge 1: SAML-enabled captive portal or dedicated
networking hardware (HW)? Originally, we considered sev-
eral SAML-enabled captive portal implementations, since the
eIDAS Network itself is based on SAML. Possible software
tools that can be used for this purpose are Zeroshell [47],
PacketFence [48], and NoDogSplash [49]. We have tested
Zeroshell, as described briefly in [33], but we encountered
several technical issues in interconnecting it with the eIDAS
Node. We have found incompatibilities between the cryp-
tographic requirements of the eIDAS Connector and the
cryptographic algorithms used by Zeroshell. Additionally,
the SAML metadata of Zeroshell is not published (i.e. avail-
able at an URL), so the eIDAS Connector needs to con-
figure it statically instead of downloading it at run time.
Due to these limitations, Zeroshell is partly incompatible
with the eIDAS-Node and should be modified in part. As a
consequence, we have adopted the second choice.
Challenge 2: Whitelisting. The dedicated networking HW
(i.e. the WLC) needs to support whitelisting, so an Access
Control List (ACL) needs to be configured and updated con-
tinuously. As described in Sec. V-C, the discovery of the
URLs to be whitelisted can pose problems (independently of
the HW used), while the ACL may have a limited size. First
of all, at least one ACL entry needs to be created for each
eIDAS Proxy in the other MS countries. Next, depending on
how many IdPs need to be configured for each MS country,
it might not be possible to add an ACL entry for each of them
due to the limited ACL size. However, this depends also on
which WLC software version is employed.
Challenge 3: SPID interface or eIDAS interface? Since
the WLC can be configured with an external application
to handle authentication, it is possible to develop a Wi-Fi
access eIDAS application with a SPID interface towards the
Italian SP Proxy, as we did for the Login with eIDAS ser-
vice. Alternatively, the Wi-Fi access with eIDAS application
could communicate directly with the eIDAS Connector via
the eIDAS protocol. We have adopted the second choice,
although an Italian SP that already provides Wi-Fi access via
SPID to the Italian citizens might prefer the first solution
to allow also foreign citizens to gain Wi-Fi access through
eIDAS (via SPID interface). Examples of some public enti-
ties that exploit SPID-aware captive portals in public places
are the SPIDwifi-UniTO [50] in place at the University of
Torino (Italy) or the free Wi-Fi of the City of Turin [51].
B. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
Together with the network team at our university, we have
installed dedicated network equipment, which is identical to
the one used in production to provide theWi-Fi access service
in the university area. The testbed environment illustrated
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FIGURE 7. Testbed environment for Wi-Fi access through eIDAS Network.
in Fig. 7, is composed of several networking components,
which have been properly connected and configured as
described further below:
a) an Access Point Cisco 3700. This component has been
configured with a new SSID named ‘‘eIDAS’’.
b) a Cisco 2500 SeriesWireless LANController (WLC). This
component is a central element in our testbed and communi-
cates with all the other ones. Its configurationwasmodified to
allow external authentication through the Wi-Fi access with
eIDAS application. The WLC internal database can hold at
most 2048 guest client accounts. More accounts, if needed,
can be created on an external RADIUS server [52]. In this
WLCmodel, the number of simultaneously active guest client
sessions is limited to 1000, but other Cisco WLC models can
go up to 64,000 [53].
c) a FortiGate 60D firewall. This component controls the
communications between the inside (private) network and the
Internet. Thus, we have configured several firewall policies
to control the connections in three stages: (i) before the
authentication took place; (ii) during the authentication with
eIDAS; (iii) after the authentication with eIDAS has been
completed.
Besides, we have installed a dedicated server connected to
the Cisco WLC, which runs theWi-Fi access eIDAS applica-
tion. We developed this application by exploiting the eIDAS
demo-SP application, which is part of the official eIDAS
source code v1.4.4 [6]. Such application already supports
the eIDAS protocol, including eIDAS messages generation
and validation, SAML metadata downloading validation and
processing, and citizen country selection.
For the TLS communication with the user agent,
we obtained an X.509 certificate from Let’s Encrypt [54] and
configured it into the Wi-Fi access eIDAS application. For
the same application, we generated three more X.509 cer-
tificates allowing it to communicate via eIDAS protocol
TABLE 2. Configuration of network interfaces (on Fortigate firewall).
TABLE 3. Firewall policies configuration (on FortiGate firewall).
TABLE 4. NAT Rule configuration (on FortiGate firewall).
with the eIDAS Connector, and we’ve configured them into
the dedicated keystore [55]. In particular, one certificate for
validation of the digital signature on the SAML metadata
of the Wi-Fi access eIDAS application, one for validation
of the digitally signed SAML messages sent to the eIDAS
Connector, and one needed for the decryption of the received
SAML attributes values.
Subsequently, we have modified the application in sev-
eral parts, such as to generate temporary guest accounts
upon successful eIDAS authentication. Such accounts are
subsequently configured (over a secure SSH channel) in the
Cisco WLC device. The username of a temporary guest
account is composed of the eIDASPersonIdentifier (for user
traceability) plus a pseudo-random string to avoid username
conflicts among multiple sessions of the same user. The
password, instead, is a pseudo-random string. The lifetime of
the temporary guest account can be configured in the Wi-Fi
access eIDAS application, and, once expired, the network
access is denied to the user. Moreover, we have used the
additional PC in the testbed also for configuring the net-
work elements. When needed, to set up and update their
configuration, we have used the management applications
to connect to the Cisco WLC and the firewall. Additional
details on the configuration of the network components in
the testbed environment, as well as our ad-hoc Wi-Fi access
eIDAS application may be found in [56].
The sequence diagram describing the eIDAS-enabled
Wi-Fi access authentication flow is illustrated in Fig. 8, and
is described below.
On a device (e.g. a PC or a mobile phone with Wi-Fi
connectivity), the person chooses first the ‘‘eIDAS’’ SSID
configured on theAccess Point. At this step, in aweb browser,
the user can try to access via HTTP a web page at his choice,
and the Cisco WLC intercepts the request (step 1). Note
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FIGURE 8. Sequence diagram for Wi-Fi access with eIDAS. Notation:
enc(X )Y means data X is encrypted by using X.509 certificate of Y ,
(Auth)Z means data Auth is digitally signed by Z .
that the Cisco WLC cannot capture web browser’s requests
over HTTPS, so a failed connection would occur. Some
browsers automatically use HTTPS even when the user wants
to use HTTP. In this case, other alternatives exist, e.g. many
operating systems and web browsers nowadays provide an
‘‘Open network login page’’ button so that when clicked, they
automatically open a default HTTP connection, which can be
further intercepted by the captive portal.
Next, the Cisco WLC redirects the user browser to the
Wi-Fi access eIDAS application, where the user selects the
citizen country code (steps 2-3). By clicking on a dedicated
‘‘Loginwith eIDAS’’ button, an eIDAS-Auth-Req is generated
and is sent through the user browser to the Italian eIDAS
Connector (steps 4-5). The steps 6-11 contain the eIDAS
messages generation and processing as described in Sec. III.
When the eIDAS Connector sends back the eIDAS-Auth-
Res to the Wi-Fi access with eIDAS application (step 12),
a temporary user with a random password is created based
on the eIDAS PersonIdentifier (step 13). Next, the appli-
cation connects over an SSH channel to the Cisco WLC
to create a temporary guest user account with the above
credentials, along with certain parameters, such as the tem-
porary account’s lifetime (step 14). Subsequently, the Wi-Fi
access eIDAS application sends the temporary guest account
name and password via the user browser to the Cisco WLC
(steps 15-16). Finally, if a match is found among the tempo-
rary guest accounts created, then Cisco WLC grants Internet
access to the user’s device (step 17), otherwise the network
access is denied (step 18).
C. DISCUSSION AND OPEN ISSUES
The usage of automatically-generated temporary guest
accounts on the WLC allows us to mitigate some common
attacks against username and password-based authentication:
• The automatically generated password can have length
and complexity of choice, protecting the user from a
dictionary attack.
• There is no password reuse problem since the
pseudo-random password is not shared among different
accounts of the same user.
• Usually, in a Wi-Fi access scenario multiple sessions
of the same user are allowed to permit the usage of
several devices at the same time (e.g. a laptop and a
smartphone). However, this implies that if an attacker
discovers a password, he can use it at the same time
as the legitimate user. In our proposed solution, each
temporary guest account can have only one active ses-
sion. The user can still access the network using several
devices at the same time, but each user device is associ-
ated with a different temporary guest account.
• Temporary guest accounts have a limited lifetime which
can be configured by the administrator, so compromised
passwords can be used for a limited time interval.
From the privacy point of view, the usage of eIDAS
authentication protects against user tracking done by IdPs.
In Eduroam for example, the connection between the IdP and
the SP discloses to the IdP details about the SP the user is
authenticating for and the location. By exploiting the eIDAS
Network, the IdP only connects to the eIDAS-Proxy-Service,
so the user’s location is not disclosed.
To allow the user to reach the IdP’s authentication end-
point or other endpoints of his national eID scheme, we had
to whitelist them in the ACL of the WLC. In particular,
we have whitelisted the IP addresses of the following entities,
although it is possible to configure also their DNS names:
(a) the Wi-Fi access eIDAS service, (b) the (Italian) eIDAS
Connector, (c) the (Italian) eIDAS Proxy, (d) the IdP Proxy,
(e) the national IdPs’ authentication endpoints, such as of
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FIGURE 9. Services validation by users employing different SPID IdPs (b), various web browsers (c) and operating systems (d), and user
perception on services use (a).
InfoCert SpA or Poste Italiane, (f) the eIDAS Proxies in
the other MS countries, and (g) the authentication endpoints
of the national eID schemes in other MS countries (when
known).
Thus, two critical points still remain and need to be miti-
gated with alternative methods:
• Discovery of the authentication endpoints. For some
national eID schemes in the other MS countries, it might
be difficult to discover the actual authentication end-
points. Since this information is not rendered public
in the eIDAS Network, we can only assume that it is
obtained through an out of band channel or by using
some other mechanisms.
• Whitelisting of the authentication endpoints. As said,
the number of entries in the Cisco WLC’s ACL is lim-
ited. By configuring the IP addresses, the ACL can hold
at most 64 entries. Thus, at most 32 entity endpoints
can be configured because each entity requires one ACL
rule for the input traffic and one for the output traf-
fic. By configuring the DNS names, the limitation is
20 names. However, this limitation depends on the soft-
ware version run in the Cisco WLC component, which
is 8.2.1.166.0 in our case.
VI. USE CASES VALIDATION
To validate the implemented services, we organized several
test sessions in which we involved overall 23 people, mainly
students but also teaching staff of Politecnico di Torino. Each
test session took about thirty minutes and included experi-
ments with both Login with eIDAS and Wi-Fi access with
eIDAS. In the tests, the participants used their SPID creden-
tials issued by different IdPs, like InfoCert, Poste, or Aruba.
Moreover, they exploited their Wi-Fi enabled devices, and
the web browsers they typically employed, like Firefox,
Chromium, or Safari. Most of them used personal computers
running Windows or Ubuntu OS, but five participants have
also used smartphones. The participants had not to make any
particular configuration. When needed, in the CiscoWLCwe
whitelisted some additional IdP’s endpoints, easily discov-
ered throughDNS queries. At the end of each session, the par-
ticipants filled out an online survey about the usefulness and
usability of the tested services, and they could add comments
to clarify their answers.
The pie chart in Fig. 9 (a) summarises the answers to the
question ‘‘I’ve used my eID to connect to the Wi-Fi network
with eIDAS and I think this may help me in various environ-
ments and services where network access is required’’. Many
of the negative and undecided answers were accompanied
by comments stating that the Wi-Fi access procedure was
slower (due to the intermediate steps through eIDAS) and
more complicated than the direct access to the home institu-
tion network or the Eduroam access to the visited institution
network. Some participants were worried about the disclosure
of personal attributes sent through eIDAS Network. Others
were annoyed because the user consent request regarding
the attributes transfer was asked twice, once on the eIDAS
Node, and once on the SPID IdP. Among the positive com-
ments, we encountered the consideration of being able to
access the network without having to register or create a
new service account first. A participant said ‘‘Logging into
wifi with eID is amazing’’, another one stated ‘‘Very useful
and time-saving’’. Another participant instead proposed some
improvement regarding the data shown in each step: ‘‘The
information-gathering process might be more straightfor-
ward, so switches are active by default and the user may
choose to unselect them’’.
The other three pie charts show more details on the cre-
dentials used and the software (browser, operating system)
employed. In practice, the tests performed by the participants
involved five different SPID IdPs (Fig. 9 (b)), different web
browsers (Fig. 9 (c)) and various operating systems both
desktop and mobile (Fig. 9 (d)).
VII. CONCLUSION
The eIDAS Network links the various countries’ eID sys-
tems in a unified framework and allows persons to use, with
legal value, their national issued eID in cross-border services
across Europe. To create eIDAS-aware services, additional
work is required to adapt SP systems and workflows to
eIDAS.
We have integrated with the eIDAS Network two services
widely used in any university, and in general in most public
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entities and companies: the Login with eIDAS and Wi-Fi
access with eIDAS. We described in detail the problems
encountered and the possible solutions that may be adopted.
In the Login service, the lack of a unique persistent identifier
for individuals across the EU requires people to link together
a local identifier data (such as the national one, if defined)
with the identifier defined in eIDAS. In the Wi-Fi access ser-
vice, the integration of the eIDAS Network with the captive
portal is not trivial, and we proposed a possible solution based
on the dedicated network equipment we already have in place
at our site.
The implemented services proved feasible and they can be
adapted to the existing workflows already in place with min-
imal effort. From the user perspective, the students involved
in the validation of the proposed services perceived them as
useful, even when the services are just an add-on to other
authentication solutions. The test users have also provided
some interesting suggestions regarding the usability of the
services. Future work is needed to improve the implemen-
tation of whitelisting in the Wi-Fi access with eIDAS service
because this could affect the wide-scale deployment and use
of the service.
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